API referenceTenvelo API
https://api.tenvelo.com The contract, as OpenAPI

Contract 2026-10-10. Every path below carries its own major version.

Platform · Reference

Integrations

The software a merchant lets into its account, each signing in as an OAuth client with the scopes the merchant granted it.

Operations
3
Base
https://api.tenvelo.com
  1. GET/v1/integration-clients

    List integration clients

    No. listIntegrationClientsAuth integration-clients:read

    Returns the integrations let into the merchant's account, newest first. Only a person may read them: an integration does not see the others.

    Parameters

    • cursorquery · string

      Opaque cursor from a previous page's next_cursor. Omit to start from the beginning.

      Pass it back exactly as received. It is base64 and its structure is not part of this contract — decoding it, or constructing one by hand, will break without notice.

    • limitquery · integer · int32

      Maximum items to return. The server may return fewer, so always drive the loop from has_more rather than from the size of the page you got back.

    Responses

    • 200

      A page of integration clients.

      IntegrationClientPage · application/json
      • has_moreboolean

        Required

      • itemsarray of IntegrationClient

        Required

        • idstring · uuid

          RequiredRead only

        • namestring

          Required

          Who the integration is, in the merchant's words.

          1–200 chars

        • client_idstring

          RequiredRead only

          What the integration signs in as.

        • client_secretstring

          Read only

          Sent only in the answer that creates the client, and never again; only its hash is kept.

        • created_atTimestamp

          RequiredRead only

          Server-assigned RFC 3339 timestamp, always UTC.

          Server-assigned because device clocks drift and cannot be trusted for ordering — a till that has been powered off for a week may come back with a clock hours out. Where the device's own view of time matters it is carried separately in client_created_at.

        • scopesarray of string · enum

          Required

          What its tokens may do. A scope for a suite the merchant has not bought is refused.

      • next_cursorstring

        Nullable

        Opaque cursor for the next page, or null on the last page. Pass it back verbatim as the cursor query parameter; its contents are not part of this contract.

    • 400

      The request could not be parsed. Malformed JSON, a bad query parameter, or a header that failed to decode, among them an API-Version later than the server speaks or not a date (api-version-unknown, with the server's own in api_version).

      Distinct from 422: a 400 never reached validation, so invalid_params is absent. Retrying without changing the request will fail again, except that a request refused for its API-Version goes once the server is updated.

    • 401

      No credentials, or credentials that could not be verified — missing bearer token, malformed JWT, expired token, or a signature that failed against the issuer's JWKS.

      Refresh the token and retry once. Repeated 401 after a refresh means the device needs to re-enrol.

    • 403

      Authenticated, but not permitted. The token is valid and its merchant was resolved, but the caller's role does not allow this operation, or the target belongs to a different merchant.

      Cross-tenant access is reported as 403 on a resource the caller may not see, and as 404 where even confirming existence would leak information. Retrying will not help.

    • 410

      The request names an API-Version this server no longer serves (docs/decisions/0011). Nothing in it was read. api_version names the version the server speaks: the client is behind, and sends the request again once it is updated.

    • 422

      The request parsed but failed validation.

      invalid_params lists every failing field with a JSON Pointer, not just the first, so a client can mark up a whole form in one pass rather than making the user fix errors one round trip at a time.

      Also returned when an Idempotency-Key is replayed with a different body, and when device-computed order totals disagree with the server's recomputation.

    • 429

      Rate limit exceeded. Honour Retry-After rather than applying your own backoff.

      A fleet of tills coming back online together after an outage is the realistic cause, which is exactly when uncoordinated client-side retry turns a brief outage into a sustained one. The limit is per process, and per site for what records trade there — a request spends its site's budget, and a till's own smaller one inside it — and per (client, merchant) for everything else; no RateLimit field is sent, so this response and its Retry-After are the whole of the contract.

    • 500

      Something failed on our side. trace_id identifies the request in our tracing — quote it in a support ticket.

      The body never carries internal detail: no SQL, no stack traces, no upstream error strings. Safe to retry with the same Idempotency-Key.

    • 503

      Temporarily unable to serve the request — a dependency is down or the service is shedding load.

      Retry with the same Idempotency-Key after Retry-After. This is always safe: a request that did take effect before the failure will be recognised as a replay.

  2. POST/v1/integration-clients

    Create an integration client

    No. createIntegrationClientAuth integration-clients:write

    Lets an integration in, minting the id it signs in as and its secret. The secret is in this answer only. Only the owner may create one.

    Parameters

    • Idempotency-Keyheader · string

      Required

      A client-generated key making this request safe to retry.

      Required on every mutation that creates a resource or moves money. A till on bad wifi cannot tell a lost response from a lost request; without a key its only options are to risk a duplicate sale or to drop a real one. With a key it retries freely: the first request to arrive is processed, and every replay returns that same stored response.

      Rules:

      • Mint the key once, when the operation is first queued, and reuse it for every retry. A fresh key per attempt defeats the mechanism entirely.
      • Keys are scoped per merchant and per operation, and are retained for 30 days — long enough that a till switched off mid-sync can retry with the same key however long it stayed on the shelf.
      • Replaying a key with a different request body is a client bug and is rejected with 422, rather than silently returning the first result — quietly serving the old response would hide a real inconsistency in the caller.

      A UUIDv7 or ULID is a good choice.

    Request body application/json · IntegrationClient

    • namestring

      Required

      Who the integration is, in the merchant's words.

      1–200 chars

    • scopesarray of string · enum

      Required

      What its tokens may do. A scope for a suite the merchant has not bought is refused.

    Responses

    • 201

      The client, carrying its secret this once.

      IntegrationClient · application/json
      • idstring · uuid

        RequiredRead only

      • namestring

        Required

        Who the integration is, in the merchant's words.

        1–200 chars

      • client_idstring

        RequiredRead only

        What the integration signs in as.

      • client_secretstring

        Read only

        Sent only in the answer that creates the client, and never again; only its hash is kept.

      • created_atTimestamp

        RequiredRead only

        Server-assigned RFC 3339 timestamp, always UTC.

        Server-assigned because device clocks drift and cannot be trusted for ordering — a till that has been powered off for a week may come back with a clock hours out. Where the device's own view of time matters it is carried separately in client_created_at.

      • scopesarray of string · enum

        Required

        What its tokens may do. A scope for a suite the merchant has not bought is refused.

    • 400

      The request could not be parsed. Malformed JSON, a bad query parameter, or a header that failed to decode, among them an API-Version later than the server speaks or not a date (api-version-unknown, with the server's own in api_version).

      Distinct from 422: a 400 never reached validation, so invalid_params is absent. Retrying without changing the request will fail again, except that a request refused for its API-Version goes once the server is updated.

    • 401

      No credentials, or credentials that could not be verified — missing bearer token, malformed JWT, expired token, or a signature that failed against the issuer's JWKS.

      Refresh the token and retry once. Repeated 401 after a refresh means the device needs to re-enrol.

    • 403

      Authenticated, but not permitted. The token is valid and its merchant was resolved, but the caller's role does not allow this operation, or the target belongs to a different merchant.

      Cross-tenant access is reported as 403 on a resource the caller may not see, and as 404 where even confirming existence would leak information. Retrying will not help.

    • 410

      The request names an API-Version this server no longer serves (docs/decisions/0011). Nothing in it was read. api_version names the version the server speaks: the client is behind, and sends the request again once it is updated.

    • 415

      The request Content-Type is not supported. This API accepts application/json on all mutations.

    • 422

      The request parsed but failed validation.

      invalid_params lists every failing field with a JSON Pointer, not just the first, so a client can mark up a whole form in one pass rather than making the user fix errors one round trip at a time.

      Also returned when an Idempotency-Key is replayed with a different body, and when device-computed order totals disagree with the server's recomputation.

    • 429

      Rate limit exceeded. Honour Retry-After rather than applying your own backoff.

      A fleet of tills coming back online together after an outage is the realistic cause, which is exactly when uncoordinated client-side retry turns a brief outage into a sustained one. The limit is per process, and per site for what records trade there — a request spends its site's budget, and a till's own smaller one inside it — and per (client, merchant) for everything else; no RateLimit field is sent, so this response and its Retry-After are the whole of the contract.

    • 500

      Something failed on our side. trace_id identifies the request in our tracing — quote it in a support ticket.

      The body never carries internal detail: no SQL, no stack traces, no upstream error strings. Safe to retry with the same Idempotency-Key.

    • 503

      Temporarily unable to serve the request — a dependency is down or the service is shedding load.

      Retry with the same Idempotency-Key after Retry-After. This is always safe: a request that did take effect before the failure will be recognised as a replay.

  3. POST/v1/integration-clients/{id}/revoke

    Revoke an integration client

    No. revokeIntegrationClientAuth integration-clients:write

    Shuts an integration out. Its tokens stop working at once. Only the owner may revoke one.

    Parameters

    • idpath · string · uuid

      Required

      UUIDv7 of the resource.

      For resources a device can originate — orders, and their line items — this id is minted by the client before the record is ever synced, which is what makes an offline create idempotent.

    • Idempotency-Keyheader · string

      Required

      A client-generated key making this request safe to retry.

      Required on every mutation that creates a resource or moves money. A till on bad wifi cannot tell a lost response from a lost request; without a key its only options are to risk a duplicate sale or to drop a real one. With a key it retries freely: the first request to arrive is processed, and every replay returns that same stored response.

      Rules:

      • Mint the key once, when the operation is first queued, and reuse it for every retry. A fresh key per attempt defeats the mechanism entirely.
      • Keys are scoped per merchant and per operation, and are retained for 30 days — long enough that a till switched off mid-sync can retry with the same key however long it stayed on the shelf.
      • Replaying a key with a different request body is a client bug and is rejected with 422, rather than silently returning the first result — quietly serving the old response would hide a real inconsistency in the caller.

      A UUIDv7 or ULID is a good choice.

    Responses

    • 204

      The client is revoked.

    • 400

      The request could not be parsed. Malformed JSON, a bad query parameter, or a header that failed to decode, among them an API-Version later than the server speaks or not a date (api-version-unknown, with the server's own in api_version).

      Distinct from 422: a 400 never reached validation, so invalid_params is absent. Retrying without changing the request will fail again, except that a request refused for its API-Version goes once the server is updated.

    • 401

      No credentials, or credentials that could not be verified — missing bearer token, malformed JWT, expired token, or a signature that failed against the issuer's JWKS.

      Refresh the token and retry once. Repeated 401 after a refresh means the device needs to re-enrol.

    • 403

      Authenticated, but not permitted. The token is valid and its merchant was resolved, but the caller's role does not allow this operation, or the target belongs to a different merchant.

      Cross-tenant access is reported as 403 on a resource the caller may not see, and as 404 where even confirming existence would leak information. Retrying will not help.

    • 404

      No such resource, or none visible to this caller.

      Also returned instead of 403 where acknowledging existence would itself leak information — so a 404 does not prove the id is unused globally, only that it is not yours.

    • 410

      The request names an API-Version this server no longer serves (docs/decisions/0011). Nothing in it was read. api_version names the version the server speaks: the client is behind, and sends the request again once it is updated.

    • 429

      Rate limit exceeded. Honour Retry-After rather than applying your own backoff.

      A fleet of tills coming back online together after an outage is the realistic cause, which is exactly when uncoordinated client-side retry turns a brief outage into a sustained one. The limit is per process, and per site for what records trade there — a request spends its site's budget, and a till's own smaller one inside it — and per (client, merchant) for everything else; no RateLimit field is sent, so this response and its Retry-After are the whole of the contract.

    • 500

      Something failed on our side. trace_id identifies the request in our tracing — quote it in a support ticket.

      The body never carries internal detail: no SQL, no stack traces, no upstream error strings. Safe to retry with the same Idempotency-Key.

    • 503

      Temporarily unable to serve the request — a dependency is down or the service is shedding load.

      Retry with the same Idempotency-Key after Retry-After. This is always safe: a request that did take effect before the failure will be recognised as a replay.